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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee
CASEN0.981193-CA
vs.
ROGER HOLFELTZ

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code, Title 78, Chapter
2a, Section 3(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the Court err in finding that even though the initial stop and detention of the
appellant was illegal, no evidence should be suppressed? Was there sufficient evidence to
show that the appellant received a visual or audible signal to stop his vehicle within the
meaning of the Utah Statutes? Was there sufficient evidence to show that the appellant
received a proper signal to stop a motor vehicle while he was a driver? Did the Court
prevent the presentation of viable defenses when it ruled that the presentation of any ruling
concerning an illegal stop could not be presented to the jury? Did the Court abuse its
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discretion in denying a motion to terminate the appellant's probation?
The various issues require different standards of review depending on the issue. With
reference to the factualfindingson the motion to suppress, the appellant does not challenge
the Trial Court's ruling that the initial stop was illegal. The Court's legal conclusions based
on thosefindingsof fact are to be review on a "correctness" standard giving no particularly
deference to the Trial Court. Similarly, the Court's conclusions in regard to whether or not
evidence of the illegal stop could be presented to the jury is a question of law and should
also be reviewed on a correctness standard. See State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d. 894 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1993). In reviewing a jury verdict, the court should review the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict (State v.
Hamilton. 827 P. 2d 232 (Utah 1992), or as stated in State v. Mitchell (779 P. 2d 1116
(1989) "A reviewing court is to decide whether, considering all the evidence, there was a
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have decided the case differently" With regard to
the sentencing issue, this court will use an "Abuse of Discretion" standard. See State v.
Houk, 906 P.2d 907 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
This case is reflects a conviction of Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, a
third degree felony in violation of Title 46, Chapter 6, Section 13.5 (1), Utah Code
Annotated. This provision appears to be determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
rhis is an appeal of the conviction on the charge of Failure to Respond to Officer's
3

Signal to Stop, a Third degree felony, following a jury trial held before the Eighth District
Court in and for Uintah County, the Honorable Lynn Payne presiding, on November 5,1997.
The judgement and order of conviction were entered on March 3,1998.
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 16th of February, 1997,Vernal City Officers arrested a female suspect
for Failure to Use a Child Safety Restraint. (Trial, p. 172) Utah Highway Patrol trooper Jon
Gardner assisted at that arrest and later returned to the scene to attempt to get information
regarding the name of and parents of a child who was being taken into Division of Child and
Family Service custody based on the arrest of the mother. (Trial P. 174, 177). Upon the
return trip Trooper had some conversation with the appellant. (Trial, p. 180) The Trooper
then detained the appellant and called for a wrecker to impound the vehicle which he
believed belonged to the appellant, based on an assumed expired registration. (Trial, p.
180). The appellant got into the vehicle started the car moving it into a parking lot which
was adjacent to the area where it was previously parked. While the appellant was walking
toward the vehicle, Trooper Gardner asked the appellant to either wait or stop. (Trial, p.
184) When the appellant attempted to move his vehicle, Trooper Gardner ran to the moving
vehicle, reached inside and tried to physically remove the appellant from the vehicle. The
trooper believed he was dragged by the appellant down the road during the attempted relocation of the vehicle. (Trial, p. 186-187) The appellant stopped the vehicle after moving
it approximately thirty three feet into a driveway onto private property, although the Trooper
believed it wasfiftyor sixty feet. (Trial, p. 189 and 375-377). The appellant was arrested
for Attempted Murder of a Police Officer, a first degree felony; Failure to Respond to
4

Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony; Expired
Registration, a Class C Misdemeanor, and No Driver's License in Possession, a Class C
Misdemeanor..
C. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
The appellant appeared before the court of the 21st of February, 1997. Alan M.
Williams was appointed as consulting counsel, the defendant wishing to represent himself at
least in part in this matter. The State immediately filed a motion for a competency
evaluation of the appellant. Over the appellant's objection, the court appointed two alienists
to conduct a competency evaluation. The initial counsel for the state was Kenneth
Wallentine, but he withdrew from representation based on the possibility of a conflict of
interest. On April 15, 1997, Herbert Gillespie, the Duchesnes County Attorney became
counsel of record on behalf of the Attorney General's Office. On June 24,1997, the
appellant was found competent to proceed and Preliminary Hearing was scheduled for July
22,1997. On that date, an amended information was filed reducing the charge of Attempted
Murder of a Police Officer to that of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony in violation of
Section 76-5-103. Hearing was held and the court bound the matter on the amended
information for trial. The appellant stood mute on the arraignment. The Court entered not
guilty pleas on behalf of the appellant. Trial was scheduled for November 5-6,1997.
On October 17, 1997, the matter came before the court for a motions hearing. The
appellant was representing himself on the motions and had not prepared them. Another
hearing was held on October 23,1997, at which time the court discussed voir dire and jury
instructions. On October 31,1997, a suppression hearing was held. The issue before the
5

court primarily involved the illegality of Trooper Gardner's initial attempt to detain the
appellant. The Court did not make any formal ruling at that time on the issues presented.
There was an extensive discussion wherein the court was informed that the issue of the
court's ruling on the motion to suppress could come up at the trial. The court make it clear
that it felt that the alleged crimes of Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop and
Aggravated Assault were independent crimes and that any ruling on the law should not be
discussed at trial. On November 5, 1997, just before trial, the court issued its formal ruling
andfindingon the suppression issues. The court ruled that Trooper Gardner did not have
reasonable cause to stop and detain the appellant. The court also ruled that the trooper did
have authority to impound the vehicle he believed belonged to the appellant. The court ruled
that no evidence was obtained by the police as a result of the illegal detention or that it was
not related to the central charges of the case. At the conclusion of the ruling, the court, off
the record, ordered consulting counsel not to bring up the ruling in front of the jury.
The case was tried before a jury. The Misdemeanor charged were dismissed prior to
the case being sent to the jury. The jury acquitted the appellant of the charge of Aggravated
Assault, but found him guilty of the charge of Failure to Respond to Officer Signal to Stop, a
third degree felony. Following the trial, a presentence investigation was performed by Adult
Probation and Parole. Counsel for appellant's contract with Uintah County expired at the
end of 1997, therefore counsel withdrew on January 2,1998. On January 6,1998, Rob
Lunnan was appointed assisting counsel for the appellant. Mr Lunnan requested on
February 3,1998 that Alan Williams be re-appointed to assist the appellant. He was reappointed for the purpose of sentencing only. Sentencing took place on March 3,1998.
6

Mr. Lunnan's appointment continued for the purpose of appeal. Subsequent to the
entry ofjudgement, the appellant asked Mr. Lunnan to file an appeal in this matter. Mr.
Lunnan declined, citing his contract with the county as paying him only for those appeals he
felt were meritorious. The appellant therefore filed this appeal pro se. Mr. Lunnan
abandoned his contract with Uintah County in about August 1998. Cindy Barton-Coombs
assumed duties as public defender, but the appellant requested that Mr. Williams be reappointed for the purposes of appeal. Hearing was held on October 14, 1998, re-appointing
Mr. Williams as consulting assisting counsel for the appellant.
Pursuant to the appeal filed by the appellant, the matter was transferred to this court.
The matter was returned again to the Eight District Court on February 22,1999 for hearing
on a motion to supplement the record. The court ruled on March 31,1999, that the record
should be supplemented by adding the substance of the off the record conversation on
November 5,1997 wherein both counsel were ordered not to bring up the court's ruling on
the motion to suppress. On April 13,1999, the courtfinalizedits order concerning the
supplementation of the record. In the meantime, Adult Probation had filed a motion to
terminate the appellant's probation. The court denied that motion as well on April 13,1999,
adding that it would not grant any motion for early termination of probation filed by the
appellant. The case was later returned to this court on or near February 11,2000.
The matter again came before the Eight District Court on February 29,2000 on an
Adult Probation and Parole motion to terminate probation. The court informed the
defendant that he expected to deny the motion again, however the hearing was continued.
The appellant filed a Notice and Demand for Judicial Recusal for Disability on March 21,
7

2000 alleging in part that Judge A. Lynn Payne should recuse himself from consideration
based on his February 29, 2000 comment that he was going to deny the termination before he
heard anything from the appellant. The Recusal was referred to Judge Lyle Anderson who
denied it on May 19, 2000. The matter of probation termination came before the court again
on August I, 2000. Judge Payne took no evidence and ruled that the appellant "had not
made satisfactory progress in his duty to the W a n d therefore denied early termination.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court wrongfully ruled that no evidence should be suppressed as a result of
the illegal stop and detention of the appellant. The Trial Court also wrongfully ruled that
there was sufficient reason for Trooper Gardner to impound the vehicle. The evidence of
any command to stop was a fruit of the illegal detention and therefore should have been
suppressed. The Court additionally ruled and ordered that the fact that the initial detention
was illegal could not be brought before the jury. As a result, the Trial Court effectively ruled
that the appellant could be convicted for failing to respond to an illegal order to stop.
The evidence was inadequate to show that the appellant received a visual or audible
signal to stop as outlined in the Utah Statutes. The appellant was not given a proper signal to
stop while he was the operator of a vehicle. The Court wrongfully denied Adult Probation
and Parole's motion to terminate probation making factual findings without holding any
hearing.
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY THE
POLICE AS A RESULT OF THE ILLEGAL STOP BY THE TROOPER.
The Trial Judge issued its formal ruling regarding the motion to suppress evidence on
the morning of November 5, 1997 just prior to the beginning of trial in this matter. The
factual basis for the suppression was taken from the court's adoption of the Preliminary
Hearing transcript and further evidence presented on October 31,1997. The court found that
Trooper Jon Gardner had no reasonable articulable suspicion that the appellant had
committed any crime. (Ruling prior to Trial, Transcript p. 19 and 21) The appellant was in
the vicinity of someone who had previously arrested and the Trooper felt that the appellant
was not coooperative in giving information concerning the identity of a child who was being
taken into State's custody based on her mother's arrest. The appellant was also in the general
proximity of a vehicle which the trooper could see had a Washington license plate. (PH
Transcript, p. 25) The license plate had a sticker indicating either "Aug" or "8" of "96".
With no evidence, the Trooper detained the appellant on suspicion of the crime of Driving
With an Expired Registration. The Trooper did not check with dispatch to see if the license
plate was actually expired, but assumed that under Washington law, the stickers indicated an
expiration date rather than an issue date for the plate. (Oct 31 hearing, P. 30-31) Trooper
Gardner then approached the appellant and detained him for the purpose of investigating the
supposed violation.
The Trial Court correctly ruled that the stop of the appellant was illegal. It
incorrectly ruled that the impound of the vehicle was legal. Section 41-la-l 101, Utah Code
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Annotated outlines the prerequisities for a vehicle to be impounded. It states in pertinent
part:
(1) The division of any peace officer, without a warrant may seize and take
possession of any vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor:
(a) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe had been stolen;
(b) On which any identification number has been defaced, altered, or
obliterated;
(c) That has been abandoned on the public highways;
(d) For which the applicant has written a check for registration or title fees
that has not been honored by the applicant's bank and that is not paif with
thirty days;
(e) That is placed on the water with improper registration;
(f) That is being operated on a highway:
(i) with registration that has been expired for more than three months;
(ii) having never been properly registered by the current owner;
(iii) with registration that is suspended or revoked.
Subsections (a) through (e) have no relevance to this case. The only basis for the impound
would be under subsection (f), that is that the vehicle was being operated on a highway.
There is no evidence that the vehicle was being operated at the time Trooper Gardner
decided to impound the vehicle. He stated that he pulled up behind the Subaru which was
parked (Trial, p. 178) He saw a Washington registration sticker that said either AUG or 8,
96. He knew nothing of Washington law. He did not know whether the sticker referred to
the date of expiration or issue under Washington law. He did not radio dispatch to find out
any expiration date. (October 31, p. 30-31).
The Court attached no significance to its own ruling concerning the illegal stop.
The Court believed that evidence gathered subsequent to the officer's illegal action was not a
result of the illegality. (Trial transcript, p. 24) This is ludicrous. The very act upon which
this whole trial was based, was the request by Trooper Gardner that the appellant should
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"stop or wait" while the appellant was walking toward the vehicle which he intended to
impound. No other evidence of any visual or audible signal to stop was presented to the
Court. As the Trial Court ruled, "Up to the time that Mr. Holfeltz started to walk towards
the vehicle, Mr. Gardner had not observed any violations of the law with respect to Mr.
Holfeltz. Nothing that he gathered was relevant or incriminating as to an element of this
crime." (Trial transcript, p. 21). The Trooper had no legal authority to make such a stop.
His belief that he had any authority to make a stop was based solely on his illegal conduct.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Wong Sun V. U.S. (371 U.S. 471)nearly
forty years ago wherein the doctrine usually called "fruits of the poisonous tree" was
established. This court as recently as the last month or so decided the case of State vs.
Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, followed that doctrine in setting forth the test. In deciding
whether or not evidence should be excluded, the test is whether the evidence has been come
at by exploitation of the illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint. Here, evidence of the verbage alleged as the signal to stop were the direct
result of the illegal detention, and indeed furthered the illegal stop. It was in immediate
proximity in time to the illegality. It thus should have been excluded.
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE ARRESTING
OFFICER GAVE A VISUAL OR AUDIBLE SIGNAL TO STOP

Section 41-6-13.5, Utah Code Annotated, provides that "An operator who, having
received a visual or audible signal from a peace office to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates
his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the
11

operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree." The appellant was convicted
under this statute. No place in the statute itself defines a "visual or audible signal to stop."
The next section, Section 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, however refers to the privileges
allowed to an emergency vehicle. It specifically grants the privileges of pursuit only to those
vehicles when the operator of the emergency vehicle in pursuit "sounds both an audible
signal under Section 41-6-146, and uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132,
which is visible from in front of the vehicle, " Section 41-6-14(4)(a) Utah Code Annotated.
Those sections in turn define both visual and audible signals.
Section 41-6-132, Utah Code Annotated provides that:
(a) Every authorized emergency vehicle shall, in addition to any other equipment
required by this chapter, be equipped with signal lamps mounted as high and as widely
spaced laterally as is practicable, which shall be capable of display to the front two
alternately flashing red lights located at the same level and to the rear two alternating
flashing red lights located at the same level, and these lights shall have sufficient intensity to
be visible at 500 feet in normal sunlight.
(b) A police vehicle when used as an authorized emergency vehicle may but need not
be equipped with alternately flashing lights specified herein.
(c ) In addition to the alternately flashing lighting described in Subsection (a), any
authorized emergency vehicle may be equipped with a lighting device displaying rotating
beams of red light, of red and white light, or red and blue light.
Section 41-6-146(d) Utah Code Annotated provides that:
Every authorized emergency vehicle shall be equipped with a siren, whistle, or bell,
capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than
500 feet and of a type approved by the department, but such siren shall not be used except
when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit
of an actual or suspected violator of the law, in which said latter events the driver of such
vehicle shall sound said siren when reasonably necessary to warn pedestrians and other
drivers of the approach thereof.
In this case, the only signal to stop which Trooper Gardiner claims he gave to the
12

appellant to stop was verbal, that is, an order to "stop or waif when the appellant was
walking to the vehicle. (Trial p. 184) No lights or siren were used until after the vehicle had
come to a complete stop. (Trial, p. 230) The Prosecutor argued to the jury that Trooper
Gardiner's grabbing of the appellant and trying to pull him from a moving vehicle
constituted a visual or audible signal to stop. That likewise does not constitute a sign to stop
under the statute. The rights that a peace officer may have and the duties that the operator of
a vehicle are dependent on the defined visual or audible signal expressed by the legislature in
the above sections. No such visual or audible signal was given.
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE APPELLANT WAS THE
OPERATOR OF A VEHICLE WHEN THE VERBAL SIGNAL TO STOP WAS GIVEN.
41-6-13.5 Utah Code Annoted provides in part that "An operator who, having
received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to stop, operates his vehicle in willful
or wanton disregard...
Trooper Gardner made no claim to have given any signal to the appellant to stop except his
verbal warning or command to stop while the appellant was walking towards the motor
vehicle which he moved to a private parking lot. A fair reading of the statute is that the
alleged wrongdoer must be an operator, that is be in operation of a vehicle when he receives
a proper signal from a peace officer to stop in order for this crime to attach. This is further
reinforced by a reading of the statute just prior to section 13.5.
Section 41-6-13(a), Utah Code Annotated, provides that" A person may not willfully
fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any peace officer, fireman,
flagger at a highway construction or maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing
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guard invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. That offense is a
Class B Misdemeanor rather than the third degree felony which was charged in this case.
Section 13(a) specifically refers to those cases where a person has a duty to comply with
orders or directions of peace officers regardless of their status as operators, pedestrians, or
spectators. The jury instruction, (No. 17) which explained the elements of the offense stated
that proof of the commision of the offense of Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop
required proof of each of the following elements:
1. That on or about the 16th day of February, 1997:
2. The defendant, Roger Lee Hoifeltz, was an operator of a motor vehicle:
3. That the defendant received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to
bring his vehicle to a stop;
4. That the defendant either;
a. Operated his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard. ..
In other words, the jury was instructed that the state needed to prove that the appellant was
an operator, but not that he received a signal while he was an operator. The instruction was
given incorrectly allowing the jury to believe that the offense could occur if the signal was
given at some other time than when the appellant was operating a vehicle.
The jury instruction was objected to. (October 17, p. 58) The state may claim that
the objection lodged by the appellant was too broad. That does not alter, however, the fact
that the evidence when properly applied to the law, did not provide a basis for an offense.
An improper jury instruction, even when not objected to may be considered when it is
necessary to avoid manifest injustice, State v. Blubaugh. 904 P. 2d 688 (Ut.Ct. App. 1995).
14

A failure to properly instruct a jury as the required elements of the offense charged mandates
reversal. See U.S. v. Davis. 965 F.2d 804 (10th Circ, 1992) The evidence is insufficient to
show that the appellant received a signal while an operator of a motor vehicle.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NO MENTION COULD BE MADE
OF ITS DECISION THAT THE INITIAL STOP AND DETENTION OF THE APPELLANT
WAS ILLEGAL.
Both the discussions at the conclusion of the suppression hearing on October 31,
1997 and the orders made by the Trial Court in its ruling concerning the motions to suppress
prevented even the mention to the jury by the appellant that the Court had ruled the detention
by Trooper Gardner to be illegal. (Supplement to Record, June 2,1999) This ruling had
several ramifications preventing the appellant from presenting several potential defenses.
The appellant could not present a defense of mistake of law, that is the appellant could not
present his belief that he was entitled to resist an illegal arrest pursuant to the decision
reached by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bradshaw. 541 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1975). See
also the cases cited in the dissent of State v. Gardiner, infra. It prevented presentation of any
defense on the basis that the attempted stop of the appellant was illegal. It prevented any
defense on the basis that the peace officer was not acting within the scope of his duty. It
prevented any defense on the basis that an individual may have a common lawrightto flee
an illegal arrest. It prevented presentation of any defense involving defense of personal
property from illegal seizure.
Much of the Trial Court's decision revolved around the case of State v. Gardiner, 814
P. 2d 568, (Utah 1991). The Trial judge in this case was also the trial judge in Gardiner,
therefore his discussion of the Gardiner issues and any challenge to it was particularly
15

heated. An examination of the Gardiner case is particularly appropriate in evaluating this
case. In Gardiner, the court ruled that based on the statute proscribing assault on a peace
officer, the common law right to resist an illegal arrest outlined in dicta in Bradshaw no
longer existed. That decision was based on several factors. Firstly, a defendant has no need
to resist an illegal search because he has the assurance that any evidence acquired by an
illegal search will be ruled inadmissible in a subsequent trial, citing United States ex rel.
KilheffervPlowfieki 409 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa., 1976). The Trial Court however, used
Gardiner as its justification in part not to suppress evidence. The appellant was denied his
remedy, that is no evidence was suppressed. Secondly, the statute in question in Gardiner
(76-5-102.4, Utah Code Annotated) required that an officer must have been acting within the
scope of his authority. No such requirement is included in the Failure to Respond statute in
this case.. The Gardiner court discussed how that in Bradshaw, a similar statute which
allowed arrested individuals no right to resist an arrest regardless of the legality was ruled
void for vagueness. The issue of the legality of the statute allowing an officer unfettered
protection for illegal arrests was not reached on that basis. Nevertheless, by fair implication,
if the actions of Trooper Gardiner are to have any force of law, there must be at least the
limits outlined in the current "Assault on a Peace Officer" statute, that is, Trooper Gardner
must have been acting to some degree within the scope of his authority. The Gardiner court
discussed the case of United States v. Heliczer. 373 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1967) wherein it
adopted the test of "Whether an officer is doing what he or she was employed to do or is
engaged in a personal frolic of his or her own" in determining the scope of authority issue.
Thirdly, the Gardiner court brushed by the issue presented by Section 76-2-406, that is, a
16

person's right to use force in defense of property, essentially ruling that no one can defend
personal property against a police officer. In this case, the appellant specifically moved the
motor vehicle in attempt to avoid what he believed to be an illegal seizure, a seizure which
he believed could not take place on private property. (Trial, p. 384)
The Trial Court felt that the Gardiner decision was dispositive of the issues regarding
the presentation of evidence concerning the illegal stop. At first glance, this case was very
similar because the appellant was charged with aggravated assault. The appellant was
acquitted on that charge however. This Court is bound by the acquittal and cannot consider
the assault as a factor in whether or not the jury could even hear of the Trial Court's ruling
that the stop was initially illegal. As it relates to the Failure to Respond charge, however, the
appellant was precluded from presenting legitimate defenses. Section 76-2-406, Utah Code
Annotated provides that "a person is justified in using force other than deadly force, against
another when and to the extent that he reasonable believed that force is necessary to prevent
or terminal criminal interference with real or personal property." The language of the statute
is unequivocal. A person could reasonable rely on the language of that statute, even though
the interpretation might be erroneous. Section 76-2-304(2) Utah Code Annotated provides
that:
Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a
crime unless: (a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonable believed his conduct
did not constitute an offense, and (b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's
reasonable reliance upon: (I) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for
interpreting the law in question; or (ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in a
Court of Record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for
interpreting the law in question.

17

The appellant specifically presented jury instructions to the Trial Court regarding his
belief that resistance and or flight from an illegal detention is legal The Court rejected the
instructions. The Court did not even allow the mention that an illegal stop had occurred.
Therefore the court denied even the possibility of a defense on the grounds of mistake of
law.
The Trial Court while not explicitly so stating, in effect ruled that either the officer
was acting withing the scope of his authority or that he did not need to be acting within the
scope of his authority. Presumably a peace officer is employed to make legal arrests.
Making illegal stops when there is not even reasonable articulable suspicion ( a very low
standard) that an individual has committed a crime could constitute a frolic. By not even
allowing discussion of the illegal stop, the court prevented even the presentation of the
"scope of authority" issue.
The Gardiner decision does not directly address the issue of when a peace officer
uses excessive force in effecting an arrest, but leaves open the possibility that were an officer
to use excessive force in an arrest, there still could be some right to resist an illegal arrest.
Section 76-2-404, Utah Code Annotated, outlines those situations wherein a peace officer
may use deadly force. Arguably, the attempt to pull a suspect from a moving vehicle could
constitute deadly force. Such is exactly what Trooper Gardner tried to do to the appellant. If
a peace officer used deadly force illegally, presumably that would constitute excessive force,
the kind of force that a person could legally resist. Asking a person to die or submit to
substantial risk of death from a peace officer acting illegally gives a suspect none of the
protections that the Gardiner Court believes an illegally arrested person may have. Again,
18

the order from the Trial Court's that the illegal stop could not be presented to the jury
precluded any possible review of the degree of force used by Trooper Gardiner. The
appellant could not present that issue in his defense.
The cumulative effect of the order thus prevented the presentation of defenses which
could have been asserted by the appellant. Because evidence of the court's ruling could not
be presented, appellant is now placed in the position of having a less than perfect record
upon which this Court could evaluate the probability of success in using those defenses. The
appellant's rights were thus double prejudiced, in that he could not present defenses at trial,
and he could not make a complete record for this court.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE'S
MOTION TO TERMINATE PROBATION, BY MAKING FINDINGS WITHOUT ANY
EVIDENCE OR HEARING.
On August 1, 2000, the Trial Court denied the Motion to Terminate Probation filed
by Adult Probation and Parole. There was no evidence taken, however the Trial Judge
commented that he found that the appellant had not learned his duty to the law as a result of
his probation and that he was not remorseful in any way. The standard of review of the
sentencing decision of a court are outlined in State v. Houle 906 P. 2d 907, (Ut. Ct. App.
1995), wherein the abuse of discretion standard is mandated. In State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d,
1234, (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court found that when a court fails to consider all
legally relevant factors or when then sentence imposed is clearly excessive, an abuse of
discretion has taken place. In this case, no relevant factors were considered. The Court
simply decided that the appellant was not ready for termination. The Trial Court clearly
abused its discretion.

CONCLUSION
A review of the record in this reveals a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Many of
the decisions reached by the Trial Court seem to be based on an inclusive reading and
interpretation of the Gardiner case. The rulings are based almost entirely on the supposition
that an assault took place. It did not. Thejury so found. When coupled with the inadequate
evidence concerning both the manner and the timing of the so-called visual or audible signal
to stop, this court must reverse the conviction reached by thejury in this case.
Dated this

day of

De^

, 2000.
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ADDENDUM

STATUTES
Section 41 -1 a-1101, Utah Code Annotated

i

Section 41-6-13, Utah Code Annotated

ii

Section 41-6-13.5, Utah Code Annotated

iii

Section 41-6-14(4)(a) Utah Code Annotated

iv

Section 41-6-132, Utah Code Annotated

v

Section 41-6-146(d) Utah Code Annotated

vi

Section 76-2-304(2) Utah Code Annotated

vii

Section 76-2-404, Utah Code Annotated

viii

Section 76-2-406, Utah Code Annotated

ix

MOTOR VEHICLE ACT
History: C. 1953, 41-1-79, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 150, $ 18; 1989, ch. 274, § 17; renumbered by L. 1992, ch. 1, § 133; 1992, ch.
234, ^ 9; 1993, ch. 210, k 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1979, ch 150, § 18 repealed former § 41-1-79

41-la-1101

(L 1935, ch 46, § 78, C 1943, 57-3a-79, L
1963, ch 66, § 10) relating to sale of vehicle to
be dismantled and permit, and enacted another
§ 41-1-79, renumbered in 1992 as § 4I-la1011.

41-la-1012. Destruction or change of vessel or outboard
motor — Cancellation of certificate of title.
Within 15 days after a vessel or outboard motor is scrapped, dismantled,
destroyed, or changed so that it loses its character as a vessel or outboard
motor, the title holder to the vessel or outboard motor shall mail or deliver the
certificate of title to the division for cancellation.
History: C. 1953, 41-1-160, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 351, § 1; renumbered by L. 1992,
ch. 1, § 134.

PART 11
IMPOUNDED VEHICLES, VESSELS, OR OUTBOARD
MOTORS
41-la-1101. Steizure — Circumstances where permitted —
Impound lot standards.
(1) The division or any peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take
possession of any vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor:
(a) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe has been
stolen;
(b) on which any identification number has been defaced, altered, or
obliterated;
(c) that has been abandoned on the public highways;
(d) for which the applicant has written a check for registration or title
fees that has not been honored by the applicant's bank and that is not paid
within 30 days;
(e) that is placed on the water with improper registration; or
(f) that is being operated on a highway:
(i) with registration that has been expired for more than three
months;
(ii) having never been properly registered by the current owner; or
(iii) with registration that is suspended or revoked.
(2) If necessary for'the transportation of a seized vessel, the vessel's trailer
may be seized to transport and store the vessel.
(3) Any peace officer seizing or taking possession of a vehicle, vessel, or
outboard motor under this section shall immediately notify the division of the
action.
(4) A vehicle or vessel seized under this section shall be moved by a peace
officer or by a tow truck that meets the standards established:
(a) by the Department of Public Safety under Subsection 41-6-102(4)(b);
and
(b) under Title 72, Chapter 9, Motor Carrier Safety Act.
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COLLATERAL
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Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles
and Highway Traffic § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1 to 8,
16.

41-6-12. Violations of chapter — Penalties.
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor,
unless otherwise provided.
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2,11,15, and 17 of this chapter is
an infraction, unless otherwise provided.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 3; C. 1943,
57-7-80; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 3; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 4; 1991, ch. 241, § 67; 1993, ch. 60, § 1.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for infrac-

tions, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-205, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Purpose of Motor Vehicle Code.
The purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code is to
govern the safety of the use and operation of
motor vehicles, and one who violates provisions

of this act is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of his violation. Greaves v. State,
528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16.

41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic controllers — Speeding in construction zones.
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order
or direction of any peace officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law
with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or maintenance sites are directing traffic, they shall use devices and procedures conforming to the standards
adopted under Section 41-6-20.
(3) (a) A vehicle operator who commits a speeding violation in a highway
construction or maintenance site where workers are present shall have a
fine imposed by the court that is at least double the fine in the uniform
recommended fine schedule established under Section 76-3-301.5 for the
offense.
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41-6-13.5

(b) The highway construction or maintenance site under Subsection
(3)(a) shall be clearly marked and have signs posted that warn of the
doubled fine.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 4; C. 1943,
57-7-81; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 5; 1998, ch. 317,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "stan-

dards adopted under Section 41-6-20" for "latest edition of the 'Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices for Streets and Highways'" at
the end of Subsection (2), and added Subsection
(3)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Obedience to traffic officer.
Cited.
Obedience to traffic officer
uoeaience to tramc omcer.
Pedestrian was denied recovery for injuries
sustained when she was struck by overhang of
motorbus where from the evidence it appeared
that when she was half-way across the street

the traffic light changed against her and she
stopped m the safety zone, giving the other
t r a f f i c t h e ng ht-of-way, and that the overhang
of the bus struck her as it rounded the corner in
response to traffic officers express direction.
y ^
M u
y
h L . & ^
c
%
,
*
p
'
Cited in City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d
981 (Utah 1987)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
A.L.R. — Criminal liability for false person-

ation during stop for traffic infraction, 26
A.L.R.5th 378.

41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop —
Fleeing — Causing property damage or bodily
injury — Suspension of driver's license — Forfeiture of vehicle — Penalties.
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace
officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any
vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall, as part of
any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not less than $1,000.
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death
or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amounting
to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. The
court shall, as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not
less than $5,000>
(3) (a) In addition to tne penalty provided under this section or any other
section, an operator Who, having received a visual or audible signal from
a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful
or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the
operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace
officer by vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's license revoked
pursuant to Subsection 53-3-220(1 XaXix) for a period of one year.
(b) The court shall collect the driver's license to be revoked and forward
it to the Division of Drivers' License Services, along with a report of the
conviction. If the court is unable to collect the driver's license, the court
shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If the person is the
379
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41-6-133.5

mirror, or occupant of another vehicle in use. This section does not apply to
spot lamps on authorized emergency vehicles.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-131, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 242, ^ 36.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1979, ch 242, ^ 36 repealed former ^ 41-6-131,

as last amended by L 1957, ch 78, § 8, relating
to spot and fog lamps, and enacted present
§ 41-6-131

41-6-132. Emergency vehicles — Flashing lights — Rotating lights.
(a) Every authorized emergency vehicle shall, in addition to any other
equipment required by this chapter, be equipped with signal lamps mounted as
high and as widely spaced laterally as practicable, which shall be capable of
displaying to the front two alternately flashing red lights located at the same
level and to the rear two alternately flashing red lights located at the same
level, and these lights shall have sufficient intensity to be visible at 500 feet in
normal sunlight.
(b) A police vehicle when used as an authorized emergency vehicle may but
need not be equipped with alternately flashing red lights specified herein.
(c) In addition to the alternately flashing lighting described in Subsection
(a), any authorized emergency vehicle may be equipped with a lighting device
displaying rotating beams of red light, of red and white light or red and blue
light.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-132, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 242, *} 37.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1979, ch 242,^ 37 repealed former * 41-6-132,

as last amended by L 1957, ch 78, § 9, relating
to turn signal lights, and enacted present § 416-132

41-6-133. Warning lamps.
(a) Any vehicle may be equipped with lamps for the purpose of warning the
operators of other vehicles of the presence of a vehicular traffic hazard
requiring the exercise of unusual care in approaching, overtaking or passing.
(b) After July 1, 1979, every bus, truck, truck-tractor, trailer, semitrailer or
pole trailer 80 inches or more in over-all width or 30 feet or more in over-all
length shall be equipped with lamps meeting the requirements of this section.
(c) Lamps allowed by this section shall comply with regulations issued by
the department.
History: C. 19^3, 41-6-133, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 242, <} 38.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1979. ch 242.*} 38 repealed former § 41-6-133,

as last amended by L. 1955, ch 71, § 1, relating
to side cowl, fender, running board, back-up
lamps, and warning lamps, and enacted
present § 41-6-133

41-6-133.5. Back-up lamps — Side marker lamps.
(a) Any motor vehicle may be equipped with one or more back-up lamps
either separately or in combination with other lamps, but any such back-up
lamp or lamps shall not be lighted when the motor vehicle is in forward motion.
(b) Any vehicle may be equipped with one or more side marker lamps and
any such lamp may be flashed in conjunction with turn or vehicular hazard
warning signals.
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History: C. 1953, 41-6-13.7, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 71, %
* 2; 1996, ch. 198, *> 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-

41-6-14

merit, effective July 1, 1996, rewrote the mtroductory paragraph of Subsection (6)1 a)

41-6-14. Emergency vehicles — Policy regarding vehicle
pursuits — Applicability of traffic law to highway work vehicles — Exemptions.
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an
emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the
law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsections (2) through
(4).
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing
down as may be necessary for safe operation;
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits; or
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in
specified directions.
(3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of an authorized
emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a vehicle pursuit, apply only when
the operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146, or
uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in
front of the vehicle.
(4) Pnvileges granted under this section to the operator of an authorized
emergency vehicle involved in any vehicle pursuit apply only when:
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds both an audible signal under
Section 41-6-146 and uses a visual signal as defined under Section
41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle;
(b) the public agency employing the operator of the vehicle has, in
effect, a written policy which describes the manner and circumstances in
which any vehicle pursuit should be conducted and terminated;
(c) the operator of the vehicle has been trained in accordance with the
written policy described in Subsection (4)(b); and
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in conformance with
standards established by the Department of Public Safety, Division of
Peace Officer Standards and Training, which shall adopt minimum
4 standards that shall be incorporated into all emergency pursuit policies
adopted by public agencies authorized to operate emergency pursuit
vehicles'.
(5) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5,41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this chapter does not
apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment while actually engaged
in work upon the surface of a highway. However, the entire chapter applies to
those persons and vehicles when traveling to or from the work.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-14, enacted by L.
1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1965, ch.
83, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, § 4; 1987, ch. 138, § 7;
1993, ch. 71, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws

1955, ch 71, § 1 repealed former § 41-6-14,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to apphcability and exemptions from act of certain dnvers, and enacted present § 41-6-14.
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is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
History: C. 1953,41-6-145.5, enacted by L
1996, ch. 251, § 1; 1997, ch. 101, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsection (1)
added "the owner or lessee of a motor vehicle";
in Subsection (2) substituted "Except as provided under Subsection (3)" for "In the course of
repairing a motor vehicle" and made a stylistic

change; and added Subsection (3), redesignat
ing former Subsections (3) and (4) as (4) and (5).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 25!
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

Emergency ve-

' 1:1 6 1 16 ilorii»
hides.

(a) Every motor vehicle when operated upon a highway shall be equipiu-d
with a horn in good working order and capable of emitting sound audible under
normal conditions from a distance of not less than 200 feet, but no horn or
other warning device shall emit an unreasonably loud or harsh sound or a
whistle. The driver of a motor vehicle shall when reasonably necessary to
insure safe operation give audible warning with his horn but shall not
otherwise use such horn when upon a highway.
(b) No vehicle shall be equipped with nor shall any person use upon a
vehicle any siren, whistle or bell, except as otherwise permitted in this section
(c) Any vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm signal device which is so
arranged that it cannot be used by the driver as an ordinary warning signal.
Such a theft alarm signal device may use a whistle, bell, horn or other audible
signal but shall not use a siren.
(d) Every authorized emergency vehicle shall be equipped with a'siren,
whistle or bell, capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions
from a distance of not less than 500 feet and of a type approved by the
department, but such siren shall not be used except when such vehicle is
operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an
actual or suspected violator of the law, in which said latter events the driver of
such vehicle shall sound said siren when reasonably necessary to warn
pedestrians and other drivers of the approach thereof.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-146, enacted by L
1979, ch. 242, § 54.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1979, ch. 242, § 54 repealed former § 41-6-146,

NMTK*, 'm
Duty to sound horn.
In action for alleged wrongful death of
eleven-year-old boy resulting from collision between defendant's automobile and bicycle, instruction that driver of vehicle intending to
pass another vehicle, does not, under all circumstances, owe duty of sounding horn, but
sounding of horn is left to judgment of operator
in exercise of due care, conformed with this
section, and was not erroneous. Manning v.
Powers, 117 Utah 310, 215 P.2d 396 (1950).
In action for wrongful death of eleven-yearold boy, two instructions, one conforming with

as last amended by L. 1975, ch. 207, § 56,
relating to horns and warning devices, and
enacted present § 41-6-146,

nnnsioNS
this section, to the effect that driver of vehicle
intending to pass another vehicle does not,
under all circumstances, owe duty of sounding
horn, but sounding of horn is left to judgment of
operator in exercise of due care, the other based
on § 41-6-55, were not inconsistent, where instructions dealt with different fact situations.
Manning v. Powers, 117 Utah 310,215 R2d 396
(1950).
This section does not place a duty upon a
driver to sound his horn in any particular
traffic situation, but instead requires due care
in the exercise of judgment as to whether such
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PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
The mere existence of a personal relationship
does not establish entrapment. Entrapment
requires some exploitation of the personal relationship. State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah
1993).
Although the state, through an undercover
officer, exploited a close personal relationship
with defendant, there was no nexus between
the personal relationship and defendant's offer

76-2-304

of cocaine. State v. LeVasseur, 854 R2d 1022
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356
(Utah 1993).
There was no nexus between parties' personal relationship and defendant's actions in
approaching undercover officer and inquiring
whether she could help him procure a pound of
marijuana. State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — If the
Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who is the
Next Target?—An Examination of the Entrapment Theory, 19 J. Contemp. L. 217 (1993).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 244 et seq.
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 58.
AJL.R. — Larceny: entrapment or consent,
10A.L.R.3dll21.
False arrest or imprisonment: entrapment as
precluding justification of arrest or imprisonment, 15 A.L.R.3d 963. *
Defense of entrapment in contempt proceedings, 41 A.L,R.3d 418.
Admissibility of evidence of other offenses in
rebuttal of defense of entrapment, 61 A.L.R.3d
293.

Entrapment as a defense in proceedings to
revoke or suspend license to practice law or
medicine, 61 A.L.R.3d 357.
Modern status of the law concerning entrapment to commit narcotics offense — state cases,
62 A.L.R 3d 110.
Burden of proof as to entrapment defense —
state cases, 52 A.L.R.4th 775.
Entrapment as defense to charge of selling or
supplying narcotics where government agents
supplied narcotics to defendant and purchased
them from him, 9 AX.R.5th 464.
Right of criminal defendant to raise entrapment defense based on having dealt with other
party who was entrapped, 15 A.L.R.5th 39.
Actions by state official involving defendant
as constituting "outrageous" conduct violating
due process guaranties, 18 A.L.R.5th 1.

76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law.
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law
is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his
conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable
reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a
court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a
defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser
included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he
believed.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-304, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-304; 1974, ch. 32, § 5.
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PRINCIPLES Of < 'KIMJNAl - RFHJ1 INSlBJi IT",'
Am. Jur. 2d. - 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and
Battery §§ 63, 69 to 80; 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide§ 139.
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery
§§ 87-93; 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 113 et seq.
AX.R. — Admissibility of evidence as to
other's character or reputation for turbulence
on question of self-defense by one charged with
assault or homicide lA.LR.3d 571.
Relationship with assailants wife as provocation depriving defendant of right of selfdefense, 9 A.L.R 3d 933.
Homicide: duty to retreat where assailant
and assailed share the same living quarters, 26
A L.R.3d 1296
Homicide: duty to retreat as condition of
self-defense when one is attacked at his office,
or place of business or employment, 41 A.L.R.3d
584.

76-2-4uc

76-2-404

Homicide: modern status of rules as to burden and quantum of proof to show self-defense,
43 A.L.R.3d 221.
Standard for determination of reasonablen e s s of criminal defendant's belief, for purposes
0 f self-defense claim, that physical force is
ne cessary — modern cases, 73 A.L.R.4th 993.
ineffective assistance of counsel: battered
g e s y n d r o m e ^ d e f e n s e to homicide or
Q t h e r c r i m i n a l off
u AX.R.5th 87L
. .,.,.. r
.,
~ , ..
, ,.,,
A,
AdimssiMrty of eyidmce of battered child
^ d r o m e o n l s s u e <>f self-defense, 22 A.L.R.5th
Admissibility of threats to defendant made
by third-parties to support claim of self-defense
m
criminal prosecution for assault or homicide,
55 A.L.R.5th 449.

arce in art c* (,

Any person is justified in using any force, except deadly force, which he
reasonably believes to be necessary to effect an arrest or to defend himself or
another fropa bodily harm while making an arrest.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-403, enacted by 1*.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-403.

NUTESTO
Deadly force.
In finding defendant guilty of aggravated
assault, the jury necessarily concluded that
defendant had used deadly force; accordingly,
the jury could not properly have found that

nmsioNK
defendant had made a lawful citizen's arrest
and any error in refusing to instruct the jury on
citizen's arrest was harmless. State v. Quada,
918 R2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied,
925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AJLR. — Burden of proof in civil action for
using unreasonable force in making arrest as to
reasonableness of force used, 82 A.L.R.4th 598.

76-2-404. P e a c e officer'&> umt uf deadly force.
(1) A peace officer, or any person acting by his command in his aid and
assistance, i s justified in using deadly force when:
(a) the officer is acting in obedience to and in accordance with the
judgment of a competent court in executing a penalty of death;
(b.) effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from custody following
an arrest, where the officer reasonably believes that deadly force is
necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by escape; and
(i) the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has
committed a felony offense involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of death or serious bodily injury; or
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(ii) the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a
threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to others if
apprehension is delayed;
(c) the officer reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another
person.
(2) If feasible, a verbal warning should be given by the officer prior to any
use of deadly force under Subsection (l)(b) or (l)(cX
History: C. 1953, 76-2-404, enacted by L. relating to the use of deadly force by a peace
1986, ch. 94, ^ 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 153.
officer, and enacted the present section, effecRepeals and Reenactments. — Laws . tive April 28,1986.
1986, ch. 94, § 1 repealed former § 76-2-404,
Cross-References, — Arrest, Title 77,
as enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-404, Chapter 7.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Singer v. Wadman:
Lawful Use of Force?, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 365.
Am. Jur. 2d, — 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide
§ 134.

C.J.S. — 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 104.

76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation.
(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the
extent that he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or
terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation;
however, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury only if:
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner,
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that the entry is
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal
violence to any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or
offer of personal violence; or
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the
purpose of committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.
(2) The person using force or deadly force in defense of habitation is
presumed for the purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted
reasonably and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or
attempted by use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or
surreptitiously or by stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-405, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-405; 1985, ch. 252, § 1.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Defendant's appearances at his estranged
wife's apartment to visit his children gave him
no proprietary right or justification to consider
or treat the apartment as his own "habitation,"
and his aggravated assault on his wife's overnight male companion was therefore not justified by this section. State v. McKenna. 728 P.2d
984 (Utah 1986).

AN MAMS

Evidence.
—Sufficient.
Habitation.
Legislative intent.
Presumption that action reasonable.
Unlawful and forcible entry.
Evidence.

Legislative intent.
The legislature intended to exclude actions of
peace officers in the course of their duties from
the category of intrusions that may be lawfully
resisted. State v. Gardiner, 814 R2d 568 (Utah
1991).

—Sufficient.
Jury verdict finding defendant guilty of assault by a prisoner, implicitly rejecting statutory defenses of self-defense and defense of
habitation, was supported by the evidence.
State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Habitation.
Defendant in murder prosecution, who killed
decedent after the latter refused to leave defendant's sister's house, was entitled to raise this
section as a defense, notwithstanding the fact
that the sister's house was not defendant's own.
The rule of this section is a codification of the
common-law principle that a a man's home is his
castle,".from which he may exclude intruders
by use of reasonable force, and its aim is to
preserve the peace and good order of society;
therefore, it is to be broadly construed, and
applies not only to acts in defense of a person's
actual residence, but any place he may be
peacefully occupying as a home or habitation,
including a hotel or motel room, or the home of
another in which he is a guest. State v.
Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977).

Presumption that action reasonable.
Since the addition of Subsection (2) by the
1985 amendment, a defendant need only show
that he was defending his habitation against
unlawful entry or attempted entry and, if he
used deadly force, that the unlawful entry was
violent, tumultuous, surreptitious, in stealth,
or for the purpose of committing a felony. If the
evidence establishing these facts is believed,
defendant's relevant actions and behefs will be
presumed reasonable and the state must rebut
the presumption to invalidate the defense.
State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Unlawful and forcible entry.
A finding as to whether the entry was unlawful and forcible is essential to the proper application of this section. State ex rel. R.J.Z., 736
P.2d 235 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129.

76-2-406. Force in defense of property.
A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property or personal
property:
(1) lawfully in his possession; or
(2) lawfully in the possession of a member of his immediate family; or
(3) belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-406, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-406.
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